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NOTES
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT - 1982
The sixteenth year of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)'
held few bright spots for advocates of increased disclosure of
government information. The Reagan administration continued its
trend of increased information withholding and as a result,
developments outside the courts equalled or even overshadowed
significant judicial activity.2 Responding to perceived problems of
over-disclosure, the Justice Department issued a memorandum
establishing agency procedures for the protection of trade secret
information.3 Its provisions parallel those of the still-unenacted Hatch
FOIA amendment bill, S. 1730.4 In the same vein, President Reagan
signed a controversial new Executive order that has the potential to
greatly increase national security information withholding under FOIA
exemption (b)(1). 5
In the courts, one Supreme Court decision and two circuit splits
dominated 1982 litigation under the FOIA (b)(3) federal statutes
exemption. In Baldrige v. Shapiro,6 a case with important
constitutional implications, the Supreme Court held that Census Act
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976Xas amended).
2. The Reagan administration continued the trend of increased information withholding
identified in past installments of this note. For discussion of developments under the FOIA in
prior years, see Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982
DUKE LJ. 423; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1980, 1981
DUKE LJ. 338; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1979, 1980
DUKE LJ. 139; Note, Developments Under the Freedom ofInformationAct-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J.
327; Note. Developments Under the Freedom ofInformationAct-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-197, 1976 DUKE L.. 366; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE LJ. 416; Comment,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE LJ. 251; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of InformationAct-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, Federal
Admbistrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE LJ. 115, 136; Project, FederalAdministratve
Law Developments-1970, 1971 DUKE LJ. 149, 164; Project, Federal Admnistrative Law
Developments--1969, 1970 DUKE LJ. 67, 72.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
4. See hnfa notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 32-71 and accompanying text.
6. 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
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sections 8(b) and 9(a) qualify as (b)(3) statutes and that the scope of
these statutes precludes the release of raw census data.7 In Greentree v.
United States Customs Service,8 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit split with the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits by holding that the Privacy Act does not qualify as a
(b)(3) exemption statute.9 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit revived an issue apparently resolved by Long v. IRS l° and
Neufeld v. IRSI when it split with the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
and District of Columbia Circuits over the scope of Internal Revenue
Code section 6103.12
Finally, in FBI v. Abramson 13 and State Department v. Washington
Post, Inc. ,14 the Supreme Court also addressed the FOIA's personal
privacy exemptions. BothAbramson and Washington Post significantly
revise the two-part withholding tests commonly applied in exemption
(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) analyses, although their effect on the quantity of
information withheld is uncertain.1 5
I. DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE COURTS
In its 1979 decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,1 6 the Supreme
Court limited the rights of "private parties who, having submitted in-
formation to federal agencies, seek to prevent agency disclosure of this
information pursuant to FOIA requests."'17 The Court held that
neither the FOIA nor the Trade Secrets Act' 8 provides a private right
of action to enjoin disclosure,' 9 leaving section 10 of the Administrative
7. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
8. 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9. See Infra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
10. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917'(1980).
11. 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
12. King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982); see infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
13. 102 S. Ct. 2054 (1982).
14. 456 U.S. 395 (1982).
15. See infra notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
16. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
17. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Barbara Allen Babcock to All [Federal]
Agency General Counsels (June 21, 1979), reprinted in I Gov'r DISCLOSURE (P-H) 300,791, at
300,792 Oct. 9, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Babcock Memorandum].
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Supp. IV 1980). This section provides, in part, that
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner... any
ormation... which ... concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, opera-
tions, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount
or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditure of any person, firm, partnership,
corporation, or association... shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both ....
19. 441 U.S. at 290-94, 316-17.
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Procedure Act20 as the sole basis for such "reverse-FOIA" actions. In
an effort to expand the limited scope of "submitters' rights," Senator
Orrin Hatch proposed two amendments to the FOIA-his own Free-
dom of Information Reform Act, S. 1730,21 and President Reagan's
Freedom of Information Improvements Act, S. 1751. 22 A compromise
bill, S. 1730,23 which incorporates parts of both the Reagan and Hatch
bills, would require the government to consult the submitter before re-
leasing information to a FOIA requester. This bill would also give sub-
mitters the opportunity to challenge in federal court an agency's
decision to release that information.24
Although the bill's opponents have clearly outlobbied its propo-
nents to date,25 anticipated industry response to a recent Environmen-
20. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). This section provides, in part, that a "person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The Court determined that this section
allowed judicial review of disclosures of information within both a FOIA exemption and the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Supp. IV 1980). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at
318.
21. S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S11,296 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981).
22. S. 1751, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S11,702 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1981).
23. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT ON S. 1730 (Comm.
Print 1982) (this print is the Constitution Subcommittee markup of S. 1730) [hereinafter cited as S.
1730 Markup].
24. Id at 32-34. This proposed FOIA amendment bill adds to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) a new para-
graph, (7)(A), which states:
(7)(A) Each agency shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of
public comment, specifying procedures by which-
(i) a submitter may be required to designate, at the time it submits or provides to the
agency or thereafter, any information consisting of trade secrets, or commercial, re-
search, financial, or business information which is exempt from disclosure under subsec-
tion (b)(4);
(ii) the agency shall notify the submitter that a request has been made for informa-
tion provided by the submitter, within ten working days after the receipt of such request,
and shall describe the nature and scope of the request and advise the submitter of his
right to submit written objections in response to the request;
(ii) the submitter may, within ten working days of the forwarding of such notifica-
tion, submit to the agency written objection to such disclosure, specifying all grounds
upon which it is contended that the information should not be disclosed ....
Id at 29-30.
To remedy the lack of federal court jurisdiction for "reverse FOIA" suits, this proposed
FOIA amendment bill adds to section 552(a)(4) the following language:
(B) On complaint filed by a.. . submitter after a final decision to disclose submitted
information but prior to its release, the district court of the United States.. . has
jurisdiction-
iii) to enjoin the agency from any disclosure of records which was objected to by a
submitter under paragraph (7)(A)(iii) or which would have been objected to had notice
been given as required by paragraph (7XA)(i)....
Id at 32.
25. See 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RnP. 1267 (1982). Despite widespread support from submit-
ters of confidential business information, the bill stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee at the
end of the 97th Congress. Id Lobbyists for the media, which viewed the bill as emasculating the
FOIA, persuaded the committee to delay the bilL See id at 1229. In some cases, their fear that
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tal Protection Agency (EPA) blunder may turn the tide. In September,
1982, a rival of the Monsanto Company filed a FOIA request with the
EPA for information regarding Monsanto's "Roundup," a herbicide
that produced $450 million in sales and 40 percent of the company's
profits in 1981. The EPA responded by inadvertently giving the re-
quester the herbicide's top-secret formula.26 The resulting furor in the
chemical industry, which for years has urged Congress to tighten re-
strictions on FOIA disclosures, 27 will probably lead to a renewed cam-
paign in the 98th Congress in support of the Hatch amendments and
their increased protection of submitters' rights.
Private industry may find temporary solace, however, in the Jus-
tice Department's 1982 memorandum to all federal agencies28 which
establishes specific guidelines that parallel the Hatch "submitters'
rights" proposals. The memorandum directs all federal agencies to:
Provide business submitters with prompt written notice of any
FOIA request for submitted information ....
Afford business submitters a period of at least ten working days
in which to object to the disclosure of any specified portion of the
inf6rmation and to state fully all grounds upon which disclosure is
opposed.
Give careful consideration to all such specified grounds for non-
disclosure prior to making an administrative determination of the is-
sue ....
Establish formal written procedures, preferably by regulation,
according to which the above steps are to be followed agency-wide in
all instances.29
This temporary measure was designed to fill the gap until S. 1730
is passed.30 It represents one of two recent attempts by the Reagan
the bill would cut back the amount of information currently available is justified. See S. 1730
MARKuP, supra note 23 at 29-34, 36-38, 40-42. Their anti-FOIA-reform campaign, which swept
Utah several months before Senator Hatch's reelection campaign, sent news releases to media in
Utah in an attack on Senator Hatch's efforts. In a reelection year, such boat-rocking can be devas-
tating, and in fact, the barrage did appear to prompt the Senate Constitutional Subcommittee
Advocacy Committee to eliminate some of the most controversial proposals dealing with terrorist
activity and business trade-secret information. See 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1267, 1229 (1982).
26. According to the EPA, a GS-9 employee released the trade secrets while processing the
FOIA request. The Agency uses a "special magic marker" to delete any confidential information
from files that are ordinarily releasable without it. The reproduction process then blacks out the
information marked. Apparently, the machine did not work properly that day. Washington Post,
Sept. 18, 1982, at Al, col 1.
27. Id
28. Memorandum from the Office of Information and Policy Guidance: Submitters' Rights,
replrinted in I GOV'T DiscLosuRE (P-H) 300,813 (Sept. 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Submit-
ters' Rights Memorandum]; see also Babcock Memorandum, supra note 17.
29. Submitters' Rights Memorandum, supra note 28, at 300,813-14.
30. See id at 300,814.
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administration to change the FOIA's impact unilaterally and materi-
ally without changing the Act itself. The second is President Reagan's
1982 Executive order governing national security information. 31
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION
Section (b)(1) of the FOIA32 exempts from compulsory disclosure
sensitive national security information classified pursuant to Executive
order guidelines. Although President Carter's Executive order 33 and its
predecessors 34 attempted to balance the public's right to know against
national security interests, President Reagan, in an effort to correct a
perceived imbalance favoring public access, 35 signed Executive Order
12,35636 in 1982. A comparison of the language of the Reagan order
and the Carter order reveals the Reagan administration's movement
toward restricting public access under the FOIA. 37 The Reagan order
creates new classificaion categories, eliminates the Carter order's pre-
31. See infra notes 32-71 and accompanying text.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). This provision states "(b) This section does not apply to
matters that are--()(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact classified
pursuant to such Executive order.. . ." Id
33. See Exec. Order No. 12,065,3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 706-
12 (Supp. IV 1980).
34. Exec. Order No. 11,652,3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 Comp.), reprintedin 3 U.S. CODE CONO
& AD. NEws 5513 (1972). From the Eisenhower administration to the Carter administration, there
has been a constant movement toward increased public access to information in the national se-
curity area. See infra note 43 and text accompanying notes 43-45.
35. This balance between national security and public access is delicate. Ifit tips to allow too
little disclosure, the FOIA is rendered useless. If it tips to allow too much disclosure, our national
security is jeopardized. Apparently, the Reagan administration believes that the government is
releasing too much information.
In a January 12, 1982 press release, President Reagan expressed his concern that unauthor-
ized disclosures of national security information had become a "problem of major proportions."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1982, at B22, col 5. In an interim effort to curb this problem, the President
established policies designed to limit such releases. Among the policies were provisions governing
contacts with the media, investigation of unauthorized information releases, and access to govern-
ment information. Id Although this order dealt primarily with unauthorized classified informa-
tion disclosures, the Reagan administration clearly demonstrated its displeasure at the release of
any information.
36. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
37. See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1981, supra note 2,
at 425 for an analysis of another step in the Reagan administration's trend toward increased se-
cry, see also 128 CONG. Rac. S4211-12 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger), S4212-13 (statement of Sen. Leahy), S4213-16 (statement of Sen. Huddleston); 128
CONG REc. H784 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1982) (statement of Mr. English); 128 CONG. REc. E1012.13,
(daily ed. Mar. 16, 1982) (letter of Ambassador (ret.) Samuel R. Gammon, Exec. Dir. American
Historical Ass'n). For a thought-provoking answer to these criticisms of the Reagan administra-
tion's information policies, see Reichel, Reagan Administration's Position on FOA is MIsinter-
preted, 110 N.J.LJ. at 1, col 4 (Nov. 4, 1982).
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sumption against classification, and increases the duration of
classifications. 38
A. New Classfcation Categories.
Because courts generally defer to agency document classification
under exemption (b)(1), 39 the classification standards in fact determine
the amount of information released. The Reagan order, like its prede-
cessor, establishes a threshold beyond which all information must be
classified. The Carter order stated that "information. . .may not be
classified unless ...its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be
expected to cause at least identiftable damage to the national security." 40
In contrast, the Reagan order provides that "information. .. shall be
classified when.., its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the
context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security." 4' As these language differences
demonstrate, the Reagan order establishes two new classification cate-
gories that strengthen the limitations on public access to government
information.
The "damage" standard creates the first new category. Although
the Carter order prohibited classification unless disclosure might cause
"identifiable damage," the Reagan order allows classification if disclo-
sure might cause "damage"-presumably, any damage.42 This "dam-
age" standard is not new to Executive orders governing national
security information; President Nixon's order also used it.43 President
38. For an excellent exhaustive and in-depth comparison of Executive Orders 12,065 and
12,356, see 128 CONG. REc. S4211-16 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (proposal of S. 2452, "Freedom of
Information Protection Act").
39. See Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lesar v.
United States Dep't. of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hayden v. National Sec. Agency,
452 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1978) (the disclosure of certain National Security Agency operations,
intelligence sources, and methods is exempt under exemption (b)(1)), a.f'd sub nom. Hayden v.
National Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("This is precisely
the sort of situation where Congress intended reviewing courts to respect the expertise of an
agency."), cerl denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); see also Comment, Developments under the Freedom of
Information Act-1981, supra note 2, at 429-37; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information At-1980, supra note 2, at 354-59.
40. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 33, § 1-302, at 193 (emphasis added).
41. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 1.3(b), at 14,876 (emphasis added).
42. Although the deletion of "identifiable" is, on its face, an innocuous change, it created a
great deal of controversy in Congress. The word was deleted because it placed an excessive bur-
den on the government to defend denials of FOIA national security information requests. See
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
43. National security information during the Nixon and Ford administrations was governed
by the Nixon order, Exec. Order No. 11,652, supra note 34. The comparable provision statedi
"The test for assigning [the lowest] classiflation shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security." Id at 679-80.
President Nixon designed his order to increase public access to national security information
under the FOIA. This purpose is described in its introduction:
Vol. 1983:390)
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Nixon's weak attempt to increase public access to national security in-
formation under the FOIA dissatisfied many"; this dissatisfaction
prompted President Carter to decrease further the amount of classifia-
ble information by raising the threshold to a stricter "identifiable dam-
age" standard.45 Thus, the Reagan administration's deletion of
"identifiable" signifies a return to the looser Nixon standard-a stan-
dard that allows increased withholding by classifying information that
falls below the "identifiable damage" threshold but above the simple
"damage" threshold. As the Reagan administration has noted, no
longer will the word "'identifiable' [place] an excessive burden on the
government to defend in court decisions to deny FOIA requests on na-
tional security grounds."
The Reagan order's "mosaic theory" of classification provides the
basis for the second new category.47 The Reagan order allows agencies
to classify information when its release might cause damage either
alone or when combined with other information from the same docu-
ment or from other sources available to the requester.48 Comparing the
"mosaic-theory" provision with other FOIA standards demonstrates
how it may severely restrict public access to government information.49
The interests of the United States and its citizens are best served by making infor-
mation regarding the affairs of Government readily available to the public. This concept
of an informed citizenry is reflected in the Freedom of Information Act and in the cur-
rent public information policies of the executive branch.
Id at 678; see also 128 CONG. REc. S4211, S4214 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982); N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1982, at E17, col 5.
44. 128 CONG. REc. S4211, S4214 (daffy ed. Apr. 28, 1982).
45. See generally id
46. Id at S4213. The "damage" threshold is more easily defensible but its adoption touched
off a furor in the Senate. A group of senators, led by Senator David F. Durenberger, proposed S.
2452, the Freedom of InformationProtection Act, which would amend FOIA exemption (b)(1) in
two respects. First, (b)(1) would condition exemption on a showing that disclosure would cause
"identifiable damage." Id Second, (b)(l) could only exempt "matters in which the need to pro-
tect the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure." Id These changes would reim-
plement those portions of the Carter order that these senators felt were most conducive to
maximum public access. Id
47. SeeId; 128 CONG. REc. E1012-13 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1982) (letter from Samuel R. Gam-
mon, Exec. Dir. of Am. Hist. Ass'n, to Rep. Boland).
48. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 1.3(b), at 14,876. For example, ifA and B are
pieces of information in the same document that are unclassified by themselves but classified
when combined, the mosaic theory classifies each, even ifA is released without B. See 128 CONG.
REc. S4211, $4215 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (statement of Sen. Huddleston). In practice, this
theory creates a synergistic effect on pieces of classified information-although the individual
piece may be unclassified, the entire document is classified-hence, the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
49. The prevailing fear is that the "mosaic theory" alone provides sufficient incentive for
overclassification. When the "mosaic theory" is combined with the lowered threshold, see jupra
notes 42-46 and accompanying text, and the elimination of the Carter order presumption against
classification, see hfkra notes 59-63 and accompanying text, some feel that there will be no restraint
Vol. 1983:390] FREEDOM OF INFORMA TION A CT
Under all nine FOIA exemptions, "any reasonably segregable por-
tion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such rec-
ord."50 In contrast, the new exemption (b)(1) "mosaic theory" requires
agencies to classify information that is harmless when segregated-and,
therefore, "reasonably segregable"-but potentially damaging to na-
tional security interests when combined with other information. Thus,
under the Reagan order, the government may classify some informa-
tion that the FOTA would ordinarily release.-5 Such classification
poses a dilemma for the courts: should a court release all "reasonably
segregable" information or withhold it when the agency classifies it
under the "mosaic theory"? Prior to the Reagan order, some courts
released all such information, even when it comprised practically all of
a classified document's contents,52 and without regard to the re-
quester's ability to "use the non-exempt portion as a piece of some in-
telligence jigsaw puzzle and learn what the exempt portions say." 53
The Reagan order clearly contemplates nondisclosure, however.5 4
on classification. See 128 CONG. REc. S4215 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982). See generally N.Y. Times,
Apr. 11, 1982, at E17, coL 5. Contra Reichel, supra note 37, at 10.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). The segregability requirement applies equally to documents
exempted under (b)(1). Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 950-51 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
51. The language of the Reagan order cited at the text accompanying supra note 41 classifies
two categories of information: nonsegregable (harmful in itself) and segregable (harmless in itself,
but harmful in combination with other information). The Reagan order classifies both while the
FOIA demands that the latter be released.
52. See, e.g., Florence v. United States Dep't of Defense, 415 F. Supp. 156 (D.D.C. 1976).
53. See generally Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S.1235, S. 1247, S. 1730,
and S. 1751 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 887 (1981) (joint statement of Allan R. Adler, Morton H. Halperin, and Cornish
F. Hitchcock) [hereinafter cited as Hatch Amendment Hearings].
54. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. This result follows the more recent deci-
sions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that have adopted the "mosaic
theory." See, eg., Taylor v. United States Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In Florence v. United States Dep't of Defense, 415 F. Supp. 156 (D.D.C. 1976), the court
more easily resolved this conflict between segregation and nondisclosure because the segregable
information was labeled "unclassified" in the document. The court did not have to decide
whether the document itself was properly classified--it could release almost all of it by labeling it
"reasonably segregable." In future cases, however, information that is normally segregable but is
classified under the "mosaic theory" presumably will be labeled "classified." Classifying such
information will force the courts to consider the reasonableness of the classification and then
determine whether the information is "reasonably segregable." This burden in itself may lead
many courts to accept agency classification more readily.
The new Information Security Oversight Office Implementing Directive, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,836
(1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 2001) [hereinafter cited as ISOO Directive], which imple-
ments the Reagan order, now requires a written explanation supporting any classification under
the "mosaic theory." Although its effect on a court's segregability determination is unclear, the
written justification will probably prompt courts to determine that, even if segregable, such "mo-
saic theory" information is no longer "reasonably segregable."
398 DUKE LAW JOUPI4L [Vol. 1983:390
There may be a middle ground when the information sought and the
"other information" are segregable parts of the same document. A
court could release one part and withhold the other part so that the two
cannot be combined;55 however, when the "other information" is avail-
able to the requester through another source, there appears to be no
middle ground.56 The approach taken by the courts will depend on the
deference given the Executive order vis-a-vis the FOIA as a whole.
Given the recent willingness of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to follow the "mosaic theory"57 and the overall judi-
cial deference to past Executive orders,58 the Reagan order probably
will prevail.
B. Elimination of the Carter Order Presumption Against
Classffcation.
The pro-disclosure approach of the Carter order was exemplified
by its presumption against classification: "[I]nformation may not be
This dilemma may become a moot point ifS. 1730 is passed. S. 1730 Markup, supra note 23.
This bill will add the following provision after the last sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) (the
"reasonably segregable" provision):
In determining which portions are reasonably segregable in the case of records contain-
ing material covered by paragraphs (1) or (7) of this subsection [exemptions (b)(1) and
(b)(7)], the agency may consider whether the disclosure of particular information would,
in the context ofother information available to the requester, cause the harm specified in
such paragraph
S. 1730 Markup, supra note 23, at 38 (emphasis added). With respect to exemptions (b)(l) and
(b)(7), this revision "would create a new [mosaic theory] exemption under which an agency could
concede that certain segregable material is not exempt but should nonetheless be withheld because
some unspecified person could use the non-exempt portion as a piece of some intelligence jigsaw
puzzle and learn what the exempt portions say." Hatch Amendment Hearings, supra note 53, at
887. This provision would, in effect, make the "mosaic theory" a permanent part of the FOIA.
55. This is the purpose of classifying each piece of information in a document. The new
ISOO Directive, .pra note 54, requires paragraph markings that designate the classification level
of each piece of information. The requirement may be waived, however. Id at 27837.
56. Such an inquiry into the other information available to the requester has been criticized
as contrary to the essence of the FOIA First, it gives the FOIA a "tenth exemption" by "allowing
agencies to say, in effect, this record cannot be withheld under any exemption, but we are going to
deny access to it anyway." Hatch Amendment Hearings, supra note 53, at 885. Second, this mosaic
theory "gives agency personnel the discretion to inquire into why requesters seek particular
records, even though the FOIA has been interpreted to make records available, regardless of the
purpose for which they are sought" Id.
57. See Taylor v. United States Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halperin v.
CIA. 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also supra note 54.
58. The District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that courts must weigh the conflicting
"reasonably segregable" and "Executive order" provisions on a case-by-case basis. See Founding
Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Subsequent case-by-case analy-
ses, however, have largely deferred to agency classification. See, eg., Military Audit Project v.
Casey, No. 75-2103 (D.D.C. June 10, 1980),a 'd, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981); supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
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classified" unless it satisfies the "identifiable damage" threshold.5 9 In
contrast, the corresponding Reagan order section states that "informa-
tion ... shall be classified" when it meets the "damage" threshold.6 0
Changing "may not" to "shall" eliminates the presumption against
classification, contributing significantly to the Reagan order's anti-dis-
closure approach.
In addition, the Reagan and Carter orders take different ap-
proaches toward resolving reasonable doubt about the need to classify
and the appropriate level of classification. Section 1-101 of the Carter
order reiterated the presumption against classification: "if there is rea-
sonable doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the infor-
mation should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should
be used, or the information should not be classified."61 Section 1-1 of
the Reagan order again eliminates that presumption: "[i]f there is rea-
sonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safe-
guarded as if it were classified. . . . If there is reasonable doubt about
the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the
higher level of classification." 62
Eliminating the presumption against classification will not affect
clearly classifiable or nonclassifiable information; it will probably re-
sult, however, in more classification of borderline information. Because
the Reagan order also moved the borderline back to the "damage"
threshold, a much wider range of information can be classified and
thus made exempt from FOIA disclosure.6 3
C. Increasing Classf/cation Duration.
The Carter order provided that information should be declassified
when the need to protect it is "outweighed by the public interest in
disclosure."" In contrast, the Reagan order states that information will
be declassified when "national security considerations permit," 65 a
59. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 33, § 1-302, at 193.
60. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 1.3(b), at 14,876.
61. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 33, § 1-101, at 191.
62. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 1-1(c), at 14,874.
63. See sipra note 46.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 33, § 3-303, at 197. This balancing test also appears
in the preamble to the Carter order "By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States of America, in order to balance thepublic's interest in access to
Government information with the need to protect certain national security infornation from disclosure
. The deletion of this balancing test created considerable controversy in Congress. It
prompted several senators to propose a bill designed to insert the 'identifiable" damage standard
and this balancing test into exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA. See supra note 46.
65. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 3.1(a), at 14,878.
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standard allowing much greater discretion.66 The Carter order's bal-
ancing test required agencies to demonstrate a need to protect informa-
tion that exceeded the public interest in that information, but the
Reagan order apparently allows the slightest national security consid-
eration to justify continued classification. 67 As a result, the order in-
creases the potential for longer classification durations.
Because declassification standards are useful only if applied, the
interval between classification reviews also determines classification
duration. Section 1-402 of the Carter order established maximum clas-
sification or review periods of twenty years for domestic information
and thirty years for foreign information. At the end of the period, in-
formation was either automatically declassified or reviewed to deter-
mine whether classification should continue. This section provided
also that declassification or review must occur "as [soon] as national
security permits."' 68 Section 1.4(a) of the Reagan order eliminates the
twenty and thirty year time limits and merely states that information
"shall be classified as long as required by national security considera-
tions."' 69 Under the Reagan order, therefore, mandatory review of clas-
sification occurs only when the information is initially classified.70 This
open-ended standard in effect translates the Reagan order classification
66. Although the Carter order balancing test was also discretionary, it at least required a
comparison of national security interests and a quantifiable public interest. See Marks v. Turner,
I (P-H) 80,151 (D.D.C. 1980) (courts can order the government to balance public interest against
national security). Butsee Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (balancing is at the
agency's discretion, aj'd, 521 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 679 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1981), cert
dend, 103 S. Ct. 51 (1982). The Reagan order provides no standard against which "national
security considerations" can be measured.
67. Senator Huddleston identified this theme of the Reagan order by focusing on its declas-
sification guidelines:
The new Executive order makes extensive changes in the system for declassification of
documents. The full scope of these revisions is not entirely clear, because much will
depend upon an implementing directive to be issued by the Information Security Over-
sight Office. Nevertheless, the thrust of the Reagan administration's policy is reflected in
the deletion of the statement from the Carter order that declassification "shall be given
emphasis comparable to that accorded classification." Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra
note 33, § 3-301, at 197.
128 CONG. REc. S4215 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982). The ISOO implementing directive referred to by
Senator Huddleston presents no change from the philosophy established in the Reagan order.
ISOO Directive, supra note 54.
68. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 33, § 1-402, at 193. This provision states, in part-
Only officials with Top Secret classification authority and agency heads listed in Section
1-2 may classify information for more than six years. .... In such cases, a declassifica-
tion date or event, or a date for review, shall be set. This date or event shall be as earl,
as national security permits and shall be no more than twenmy years after original classifi-
cation, except that for foreign government information the date or event may be up to
thirty years after original classification.
d (emphasis added).
69. Exec. Order No. 12,356, supra note 36, § 1.4(a), at 14,877.
70. Id § 1.4, at 14,877.
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period from "as long as required by national security considerations"
to "until the government again considers these national security consid-
erations." Information may thus remain classified forever. 71
III. THE FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTION
The FOIA's third exemption, section (b)(3), allows agencies to
withhold information that is "specifically exempted from discovery by
statute," if that statute "(A) requires that the matters be withheld...
in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) estab-
lishes particular criteria for withholding. 72 In 1982, the federal courts
examined the relationship of three statutes to the (b)(3) exemption. In
Baldrige v. Shapiro 73 the Supreme Court held that Census Act sections
8(b) and 9(a) qualify as FOIA (b)(3) statutes.74 In Greentree v. United
States Customs Service,75 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit split with the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sev-
71. See id § 1.4(a), at 14,874. Although this section additionally provides that when "it can
be determined, a specific date or event for declassification shal be set by the original classification
authority at the time the information is originally classified," the order provides little incentive to
establish such dates. Id; see also supra note 68. Unless specifically requested under FOIA, most
domestic national security information classified under the Carter order will not be reviewed for
declassification for at least fourteen more years. See supra note 68. Under the open-ended review
standards of the Reagan order, this period before review could be longer.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). In the sixteen years since the FOIA was passed, a great deal
of litigation has identified some of the statutes that satisfy the exemption, see, e.g., Cohsumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102 (1980) (Consumer Product Safety Act
§ 6(b)(l) is a (b)(3) statute); Founding Church of Scientology v. National Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d
824 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (50 U.S.C. § 402); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (50 U.S.C.
§ 403(d)(3)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.
1977) (26 U.S.C. § 6103); Seymour v. Barabba, 559 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (13 U.S.C.
§ 9(a)(l)); Parker v. EEOC, 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)); United Tech-
nologies Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845 (D. Conn. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e)), and some
that do not, see, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(c) is not a (b)(3) statute); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (50 U.S.C. § 2406(c)).
73. 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
74. 13 U.S.C. §§ 8(b), 9(a) (1976). These sections provide, in part:
8(b) Subject to the limitations contained in sections 6(c) and 9 of this title, the Secretary
may furnish copies of tabulations and other statistical materials which do not disclose
the information reported by, or on behalf of, any particular respondent ....
9(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Com-
merce or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of this title-
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose
other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied, or
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establish-
ment or individual under this title can be identified; or
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or
bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
Id
75. 515 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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enth Circuits over whether the Privacy Act 7 6 is a (b)(3) statute. Finally,
in King v. IRS,77 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed with the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and District of Colum-
bia Circuits over the scope of Internal Revenue Code section 6103.78
A. The Census Act and Baldrige v. Shapiro.
For the past two years, municipalities across the nation have taken
the Commerce Department and the Census Bureau to court in efforts to
obtain information necessary to challenge the Bureau's final figures
and thereby correct alleged inaccuracies in the 1980 census. 79 At issue
was whether Census Act sections 8(b) and 9(a) qualify as (b)(3) statutes
and, if so, whether they exempt all raw census data from discovery. In
1982, these issues reached the Supreme Court.
Baldige v. Shapiro and its" companion case, McNichols v. Bal-
drige,80 were attempts to acquire all or part of the Census Bureau's
master address lists.81 Shapiro was filed in 1980 after preliminary cen-
sus data showed 70,000 fewer people in Essex County, New Jersey than
were reflected in the local tax rolls.8 2 County officials disputed this
figure under the Bureau's local review program, which allows munici-
pal governments ten working days "to provide the Bureau with data
challenging the accuracy of preliminary housing and head counts. '8 3
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
77. 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982).
78. I.R.C. § 6103 (1976).
79. As of the date Paldr'ge v. Shapiro was decided, there were approximately fifty cases in
federal courts challenging various aspects of the 1980 Census. Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345
(1982). Examples of the types of remedies sought include demands that the Census Bureau release
its data so the cities can correct the figures themselves, see, e.g., Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345
(1982), or that the Bureau include undercount estimates in its 1980 figures, see, e.g., Young v.
Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 939 (1982); Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rey'd and remanded,
653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
80. McNichols v. Klutznick, No. 80-C-1151 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 1980), rev'd, 644 F.2d 844
(10th Cir. 1981), aj'd .wb nom. Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
81. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. The master address lists, also known as the
Follow-up Address Registers (FARs), are lists of all addresses in a given municipality. These lists
are useful in double-checking census figures because, by determining the addresses the Census
Bureau actually counted, the cities can calculate the addresses not counted. See McNichols v.
Klutznick, No. 80-C-I 151 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 1980), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari, (McNich-
ols v. Baldrige), app. at A-i, A-3, Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 435 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MeNichols Cert. Petition].
82. Shapiro v. Klutznick, No. 80-2638, (D.NJ. Aug. 27, 1980),aj'dmem., 636 F.2d 1210 (3d
Cir. 1980), re'dsub nom. Baldrige v. Shapiro 455 U.S. 435 (1982), reprinted in Petition for Certio-
rari (No. 80-1436), app. D, at 7a, Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 435 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Shapiro Cert. Petition].
83. Revised Local Review Program Information Booklet (Census 1980), reprintedin Shapiro
Cert. Petition, spra note 82, at app. G, at 22-48.
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To acquire such data, the county sought to compare its tax records with
the Bureau's master address list. Similarly, in McNichols, the City of
Denver's preliminary census figures also reflected an undercount and a
much higher residence vacancy rate than expected.84 To dispute these
figures, Denver requested the part of the Bureau's master address list
pertaining to vacant housing.8 5 The Bureau denied both Essex
County's FOIA request and Denver's request for discovery under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).8 6
In Shapiro, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a
lower court order releasing the Census Bureau's master address list.8 7
In McNichols, however, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Congress' goal in enact-
ing the Census Act in general and sections 8(b) and 9(a) in particular
was to provide "both a rigid immunity from publication or discovery
and a liberal construction of that immunity that would assure confiden-
tiality."88 In response to this circuit split the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on two questions: Are Census Act sections 8(b) and 9(a) ex-
emption (b)(3) statutes and, if so, do they provide confidentiality for the
master address lists sought to be released?8 9 In the hope that Shapiro
would lead to the success of all similar census litigation, the municipal-
ities and their amici combined their arguments with positions previ-
84. See McNichols v. Klutznick, No. 80-C-1 151 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 1980), reprinted in Mc-
Nichols Cert. Petition, supra note 81, app. at 114.
85. The City of Denver contended that the Census Bureau overcounted the number of vacant
residences by "a factor of 46%." To contest the Bureau's figures, Denver needed to correlate its
vacancy information with the Bureau's vacancy data. The litigation resulted from the Bureau's
refusal to release the data. Id
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states, in part:
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) In General. Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action... including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents or other tangible things ....
Id
87. By holding that the information did not fall within the confidentiality provisions of sec-
tions 8(b) and 9(a), the district court only superficially touched the exemption (b)(3) issue. The
court's analysis of whether or not 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) is a FOIA (b)(3) statute consisted of one
statement:
Title 13... does not provide a blanket of confidentiality for any and all census materi-
als; instead the confidentiality requirement is structured solely to require that census
material be used in furtherance of the Bureau's statistical mission and to ensure against
disclosure of any particular individual's response.
Shapiro v. Klutznick, No. 80-2638 (D.NJ. Aug. 27, 1980), reprinted in Shapiro Cert. Petition,
supra note 82, at app. D, at 9a-10a. Cf. infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussion of
Supreme Court ruling that census data is protected confidential information).
88. McNichols v. Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. Baldrige v.
Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
89. Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 352-53.
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ously taken by other cities.90 Against this backdrop, the Court's narrow
decision was disappointing and anticlimatic.91
The Court dealt only briefly with whether Census Act sections 8(b)
and 9(a) are FOIA (b)(3) statutes. It held that they are: both sections
"explicitly provide for the nondisclosure of certain census data,"
thereby satisfying the (b)(3) "specifically exempted from discovery" re-
quirement, and both sections provide "no discretion... to the Census
Bureau on whether or not to disclose the information," thus satisfying
(b)(3)(A). 92
The Court went into much greater depth in determining whether
the master address lists were within the scope of 8(b) and 9(a)'s protec-
tion.93 Arguing against such a broad scope, the plaintiff municipalities
90. The State of New York presented perhaps the most significant additional argument in its
constitutional attack on the Census Act. New York's case against the Census Bureau was at that
time on petition for certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It was subse-
quently denied. See Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd and remanded,
653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981), cerz denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982). In its amicus brief, the State of New
York stated
While the precise question presented by these cases is a narrow one-whether cen-
sus address and vacancy lists are immune from disclosure to litigants challenging the
accuracy of the census--the ramifications of these and similar actions are of profound
constitutional importance. The decennial census is central to the allocation of political
rights under the Constitution. On the census rest (I) The Great Compromise between
the original states, large and small (2) the direct election of the House of Representatives
"by the people of the several States" (art. L § 2) with representatives apportioned among
the states "according to their respective numbers" based on a census which is to count
"the whole numbers of persons in each state" (amend. XIV, § 2); (3) the allocation of
votes in the Electoral College (art. II, § I); and ultimately (4) the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal votes for equal numbers of people (see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
and its progeny). Given the vital role the decennial census plays in our system of gov-
ernment, Federal statutes providing for the taking of the census must be construed in a
manner consistent with its constitutional purpose.
The Constitution requires that the census reflect, "as nearly as is practicable," the
whole number of persons in each state. That is the sole constitutional function of the
census and that high duty of accuracy flows from the constitutional purpose that the
census serves, from the language of the Constitution, and from the decisions of this
Court.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The State of New York, at 14, Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 359 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as New York Amicus Brief].
91. Several commentators and court decisions have addressed the constitutional issues sur-
rounding the 1980 Census. See Note, The Courts and the 1980 Census Challenge' Tailoring Rights
to F&t Remedes, 15 U. MicH. JJ. REF. 153, at 156-59, 172-76 (1981). The Court's failure to
consider these issues in Shapiro, and its refusal to hear them in Carey v. Baldrige, cert. denied, 455
U.S. 999 (1982), and in Young v. Baldrige, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982), left many observers
unsatisfied. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
92, Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 355 (1982).
93. Discussion of the scope of the Census Act dominated the opinion, indicating that the
Court considered the scope of the Act the most important issue. The issue is relevant to the FOIA
because the scope of any exemption (bX3) statute determines the amount of information that may
be withheld.
Another argument deserving brief mention was that section 9(a)'s prohibition of census data
use for other than statistical purposes was irrelevant because the cities wanted to use the data for
statistical purposes. See Id at 359. The district courts agreed that the cities' intended uses were
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and their amici contended that one of the underlying purposes of the
census, the constitutional requirement of "one man, one vote," depends
on an accurate enumeration.94 Accuracy in turn depends on a balance
of two factors: (1) census data confidentiality, which encourages citizen
participation, and (2) the municipalities' ability to dispute grossly erro-
neous census figures. 95 Plaintiffs argued that the Court's job was to
achieve optimum accuracy by resolving the conflict between these two
factors and suggested a balancing approach as an appropriate means to
that end.96 Under this approach, only information or data that might
identify an individual respondent would remain confidential.97 This
would protect the confidentiality of the respondent's identity and pro-
vide a way for the municipalities to meaningfully challenge erroneous
proper ones. See Shapiro Cert. Petition, supra note 82, app. D, at 9a-10a; McNichols Cert. Peti-
tion, supra note 81, app. at 11. The Shapiro district court distinguished Seymour v. Barabba, 559
F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on this basis. In that case, census data was withheld from plaintiffs who
intended to use it for private purposes. The Court summarily rejected this argument, holding that
the statistical purposes to which use of this data is limited are Bureau statistical purposes. 455
U.S. at 345.
94. See McNichols Cert. Petition, supra note 81, at 9-1I; see also supra note 90.
95. Up to a point, confidentiality enhances accuracy because, with confidentiality guaran-
teed, citizens are more likely to participate in the census. See New York Amicus Brief, supra note
90, at 26-29; Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 354 ("[Ain accurate census depends in large part on
public cooperation. To stimulate that cooperation Congress has provided assurances that infor-
mation furnished ... by individuals is to be treated as confidential."). Municipal monitoring also
promotes accuracy, up to a point, because local governments can ensure the proper canvassing
and counting of their populations. This is the admitted purpose of the Census Bureau's local
review program:
The local review program is one of several Census Bureau efforts especially designed to
improve the completeness and the accuracy of the 1980 Census. Its purpose is to allow
for the review of population and housing count by local government officials before the
count becomes final .... Local review is aimed at improving the accuracy of the cen-
sus by helping to pinpoint such major problems as clusters of missed housing units ....
Shapiro Cert. Petition, supra note 82, app. D, at 12a. The "point" is reached, however, when one
factor is emphasized over the other. When this occurs, the factors work against each other and
accuracy suffers--either confidentiality prevents municipalities from getting enough information
to make a meaningful challenge of census inaccuracies or oversights, or municipal demands for
information invade the respondents' personal privacy. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Shapiro V.
Baldr'ge, 455 U.S. at 345. The Census Bureau's position in both Shapiro and McNichols clearly
emphasized confidentiality to the total exclusion of both Essex County and Denver's ability to
challenge its statistics. Shapiro v. Baldrige, 455 U.S. at 349-52. The Shapiro district court recog-
nized the resulting adverse impact on accuracy: "[C]laiming confidentiality for such materials [as
address lists] impedes the goal of accurate and complete enumeration which the confidentiality
provisions were designed to further." Shapiro v. Klutzick, reprinted in Shapiro Cert. Petition,
supra note 82, app. D, at Ila.
96. See McNichols Cert. Petition, supra note 81, at 11-12; supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
97. See McNichols Cert. Petition, supra note 81, at 12.
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census data.98 Despite this argument, a unanimous Court failed to ac-
knowledge the underlying constitutional issues. The Court's holding
for the Census Bureau relied instead on a narrow and unconvincing
interpretation of the Census Act's purpose and language.
Focusing on the words "information" and "data" scattered
throughout 8(b) and 9(a), the Court concluded that Congress meant to
protect information and data itself-not only data that could possibly
identify an individual.99 The Court then looked to the Census Act's
legislative history and found that during the Act's evolution, Congress
became increasingly concerned about the confidentiality of raw data
accumulated by the decennial census.10 The present Act reflects this
concern by treating as confidential all "information reported by or on
behalf of" individuals responding to the census.'01 Because addresses
and vacancy data are "informatign," they are protected.' 0 2
One of this decision's most interesting aspects is its apparent break
from the Supreme Court's voting apportionment decisions, in which
the Court often implied that accuracy is the census' constitutionally-
mandated goal. 10 3 In Shapiro, however, it relegated accuracy to a posi-
tion second to congressionally-mandated confidentiality. Clearly, the
Court thought that maximizing confidentiality would also maximize
accuracy.1°4 But, because accuracy might have been increased if some
non-identifiable data had been released to the municipalities, s05 the
Court clearly did not consider accuracy its foremost objective.
98. The Shapiro district court agreed that this compromise did not conflict with the Census
Act's purpose to prevent identification of individual census respondents. See Shapiro v. Klutz-
nick, reprkiedin Shapiro Cert. Petition, supra note 82, app. D, at 1Oa- IIa.
99. See Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 356.
100. Id at 356-58.
101. 13 U.S.C. § 8(b) (1976) (emphasis added). For the relevant text of this statute, see supra
note 74.
102. Id; see Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 358.
103. In the leading voting apportionment case of Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964), the
Supreme Court held that the vote of one person must be worth as much as the vote of any other
person. Id at 8; see also Note, Constitutional Implications of a Population Undercount: Making
Sense of the Census Clause, 69 GEo. LJ. 1427, 1448 (1981). This has been interpreted as imply-
ing that the census upon which voting apportionment is based must, as a constitutional matter, be
accurate. Id at 1442-50; see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); supra note 90.
104. Throughout Shapiro, the Court alluded to the argument that confidentiality enhances
accuracy. See, eg., 455 U.S. at 361.
105. Because the purpose of the Bureau's local review program was to make the census more
accurate and because the municipalities alleged large census errors, it is reasonable to assume that
releasing data to these municipalities would considerably reduce the magnitude of any errors that
occurred.
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B. The Privacy Act and Greentree v. United States Customs
Service.
The Privacy Act's status as a (b)(3) statute has been uncertain since
its enactment in 1976. l° 6 This confusion was recently heightened by
the decision in Greentree v. United States Customs Service 1o7 In Green-
tree the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the Act is not a (b)(3) statute, thereby splitting with the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.
In Painter v. FBI 08 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that Privacy Act exemptions are also FOIA (b)(3) statutes. Painter in-
volved a combined Privacy Act/FOIA request for certain FBI docu-
ments that were exempt under Privacy Act exemption (k)(5),10 9 but not
under the nonstatutory FOIA exemptions. The district court allowed
disclosure. It reasoned that, because the Privacy Act "provides rights
to the individual with respect to his records beyond the point where
access to the public to such records ends and was not intended to re-
strict his rights as a member of that public,"' 10 it would be "anoma-
lous" to allow the Privacy Act to prohibit Painter's access to personal
records otherwise available to the public under the FOIA. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, preferring instead to read
subsection (b)(3) broadly in the absence of congressional indications
otherwise.III The court reasoned that Congress recognized that the Pri-
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). Since the passage of the Privacy Act, courts have taken several
positions on this issue. Some have concluded that the issue is moot because the Privacy Act and
the FOIA provide the same rights of access to the same information. See, e.g., Exner v. FBI, 612
F.2d 1202, 1207-09 (9th Cir. 1980) (Pregerson, J., concurring). A second position is that the Pri-
vacy Act is a FOIA (b)(3) statute. See Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v.
Kelley, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). The new third position, a
clear split with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, states that the Privacy Act is not a FOIA (b)(3)
statute. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
107. 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
108. 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980).
109. The court dealt specifically with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1976), which exempts
investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibil-
ity, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts,
or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such
material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Govern-
ment under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confi-
dence, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise that the
identity of the source would be held in confidence.
Id
110. Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d at 690 n.2 (district court decision was unreported).
Ill. Id at 691. In United States Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), the
Supreme Court decreed that the limited exemptions of the FOIA "must be narrowly construed."
Id at 361. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears not to have followed that presump-
tion in this case, weakening its argument that the Privacy Act is a FOIA (b)(3) statute.
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vacy and Sunshine Acts, 1 2 overlap with the FOIA when it specifically
stated that FOIA exemptions should not apply to disclosures required
by the Privacy Act 13 and that Sunshine Act exemptions should not
apply to disclosures required by the FOIA. 14 Congress did not simi-
larly state that Privacy Act exemptions do not apply to FOIA disclo-
sures; therefore, the court concluded that they do apply. 115 It agreed
with the bald assertion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Terkel v. Kelley "16 that the Privacy Act and the FOIA "must be read
together, and that the [FOIA] cannot compel the disclosure of informa-
tion that the Privacy Act clearly contemplates to be exempt.""u 7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's con-
trary decision in Greentree v. United States Customs Service involved a
Privacy Act/FOIA request in which the information was exempt under
Privacy Act exemption 0)(2) and, not exempt under the FOIA."18 The
Court of Appeals reversed the district court,'1 9 holding that the Privacy
Act exemption is not a FOIA (b)(3) statute. In support of its decision,
the court first examined the "third party anomaly" identified in
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1976). This section states: "No agency shall rely on any exemption
contained in section 552 of this title [the FOIA] to withhold from an individual any record which
is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of this section." Id
114. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976). This
Act amended FOIA (b)(3) to read.
(b) [t]his section does not apply to matters that are-
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b ofthis title
[Sunshine Act]), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be with-
held....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
115. 615 F.2d at 691. The essence of the court's argument was that Congress recognized the
interaction among the Privacy Act, the Sunshine Act, and the FOIA; in these two cases, it pro-
vided that the exemptions of one Act would not affect information releasable under another. Be-
cause Congress did not specifically address the Privacy Act's effect on the FOIA, the court did not
assume that Congress did not intend the Privacy Act to be a (b)(3) statute. See supra notes 113-14
and accompanying text.
116. 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979).
117. Id Terkel involved a request for investigatory information on the requester that had
been compiled by the FBL The FBI invoked Privacy Act exemption (k)(5) to withhold the docu-
ments. The Seventh Circuit held that Privacy Act exemption (k)(5) qualified as a FOIA (b)(3)
exemption.
118. The records sought in Greentree pertained to a drug smuggling conviction. The Drug
Enforcement Agency and the United States Customs Service refused to release certain requested
material, relying on Privacy Act and FOIA exemptions. On its own initiative, the district court
requested briefs on the question of whether the Privacy Act exemptions were statutes within the
FOIA (b)(3) exemption. It subsequently held that they are. The court cited both Terkel and
Paier in support of its decision. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 515 F. Supp. 1145
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
119. 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Painter.20 If the Privacy Act exempts from disclosure information
normally available under the FOIA, then the public "might gain access
to material under FOIA about an individual unavailable to that indi-
vidual himself."'121 Conversely, the government expressed its fear that
allowing an individual access under the FOIA to information ex-
empted under the Privacy Act would "render [the Privacy Act] mean-
ingless."'122 The court labeled this a "false anomaly," noting that the
Privacy Act would continue to protect "whole systems of records."'123
Under this analysis, exempting a system of records means only that the
individual cannot gain access to all of the records; it does not mean that
he cannot gain access to any record within that system.' 24 Therefore,
the particular records within the exempted system that are otherwise
releasable under the FOIA should be released to the first party as well
as to the public.
The court then examined the legislative history of both the FOIA
and the Privacy Act. The analysis focused on the legislative intent evi-
denced by Privacy Act section (b)(2), which provides that the Privacy
Act will not interfere with public access under the FOIA, 2 and by
section (q), which states that the FOIA's exemptions should not apply
to disclosures under the Privacy Act.126 The court reasoned that these
provisions held "separate each Act's exemptions from disclosure."'' 27
120. 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 110-I1 and accompanying text.
121. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d at 79. Even so, the Privacy Act
could be circumvented easily by "the first party's simply locating someone else to act as a third
party FOIA requester." Id (Third party access to information is determined solely by the FOIA,
but a first party's access is governed by both the Privacy Act and the FOIA.)
122. Id at 80.
123. Id at 81.
124. Id at 80-81. Judge Wald had "no difficulty understanding why Congress allowed law
enforcement agencies to restrict individual access to whole systems of records under the Privacy
Act, while allowing the public, including the first party, more limited access to some of the same
material under FOIA." d at 81. (emphasis added). A major reason to restrict access to the
whole system is to relieve the information-managing agencies from the strict administrative re-
quirements of non-exempt Privacy Act record systems. The court noted several such burdens that
are removed by a 0)(2) exemption. See Id; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1976) (list of administra-
tive exemptions for certain classes of systems of records). The administrative advantages to ex-
empting a record system should not, however, restrict access to those individual records within
that system normally available under the FOIA. See id at 81.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1976). This provision states in part:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a writ-
ten request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be... (2) required under section 552 of
this title [the FOIA] ....
Md
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1976). For the text of this provision, see supra note 113.
127. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used a similar
argument in Painter to support a broader interpretation of the FOIA (b)(3) exemption. That
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The court also examined the timing of the passage of the Acts. The
district court had held that, because Congress passed the Privacy Act
after the amendments to FOIA exemption (b)(7),128 the Privacy Act
should prevail in resolving conflicts between the Acts.129 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted, however, that Con-
gress enacted the FOIA (b)(7) amendments over President Ford's veto
only several weeks before enactment of the Privacy Act.' 30 Consider-
ing this temporal relationship between two laws controlling access to
basically the same information, the court was "hard pressed to accept
an interpretation of the Privacy Act that in effect repeals, for first party
requesters, those amendments only a few weeks after they were enacted
over a Presidential veto."' 31
Finally, the court addressed the interaction of the Acts since their
enactment. In particular, it noted the Justice Department's policy that
the Privacy Act is not a FOIA (b)(3) statute:132
[T]o the extent that the individual seeks access to records from sys-
tems of records which have been exempted from the provisions of the
Privacy Act, the individual shall receive, in addition to access to
those records he is entitled to receive under the Privacy Act[,j...
access to all records within the scope of his request to which he would
have been entitled under the Freedom of Information Ac ... but for
the enactment of the Privacy Act and the exemption of the pertinent
systems of records pursuant thereto.133
The Greentree opinion is one of the few 1982 FOIA developments
that did not restrict access to government information. Whether it will
prevail is unclear. On the one hand, Greentree follows a fundamental
tenet of FOIA statutory construction: FOIA exemptions must be nar-
rowly construed.134 The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh
court, instead of focusing on the presence of these provisions and arriving at the conclusion that
Congress intended to keep the acts separate, focused on the notable absence of a provision that
specifically limits the effect of Privacy Act exemptions on FOIA disclosures. See supra notes 113-
15 and accompanying text.
128. FOIA exemption (b)(7) and Privacy Act exemption (j) govern basically the same law
enforcement information; section (b)(7), however, provides greater public access to some informa-
tion normally exempted under the Privacy Act. For example, the information at issue in Green-
tree was not exempt under FOIA (b)(7), but was exempt under Privacy Act 0)(2).
129. 515 F. Supp. at 1148,vre'd, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
130. See 3 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 6267, 6290-92 (1974).
131. 674 F.2d at 84.
132. Id at 85. In fact, both Greentree and the government argued in district court that the
Privacy Act is not a (b)(3) statute. The government adopted this position after Senator Edward
Kennedy protested an Internal Revenue determination that the Privacy Act is the exclusive means
available to an individual to secure information about himself. Concerned that the greatest possi-
ble access be accorded to all, Senator Kennedy emphasized that both the Privacy Act and the
FOIA apply to such an individual Id at 84.
133. 28 C.F.R. § 16.57(b) (1981) (emphasis added).
134. United States Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); seesupra note 1 11.
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Circuits' admittedly broad interpretation of FOIA section (b)(3) vio-
lates this principle.1 35 On the other hand, the broad view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's 1982 FOIA decisions, all of which immedi-
ately restricted public access to government information. 136 Therefore,
the success of the Greentree approach depends on whether the Supreme
Court will adhere to its principle of narrow construction or whether it
has undertaken a concerted effort to limit disclosure under the FOIA.
C. Internal Revenue Code Section 6103 and King v. IRS.
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, either alone or as a
FOIA exemption (b)(3) statute, 3 7 exempts tax "return information 138
from disclosure. In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Long v. IRS 3 9 substantially narrowed the scope of section 6103 by
interpreting "return information" to include only tax information that
could be "associated with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a
particular taxpayer."' 140 Although the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (ERTA)141 specifically overruled Long,142 this so-called "identity
135. See Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d at 691; see also supra note I11.
136. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text; incfra notes 178-82, 195-99 and accompa-
nying text.
137. In Zale Corp. v. IRS, 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979), the district court determined that
I.R.C. § 6103 is the "sole standard governing release of tax return information." Id at 490. This
decision has led to two views of the relationship between section 6103 and FOIA exemption (b)(3).
One view is that section 6103 is completely independent of the FOIA: "If section 6103 is the
governing statute, reference to the policies of the FOIA is irrelevant; the segregability require-
ments of the FOIA are inapplicable; and the Secretary's decision is not subject to the FOIA stric-
tures on burden of proof and standard of review in the district court." King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488
(7th Cir. 1982). Other courts view section 6103 as a FOIA (b)(3) statute. See, eg., Chamberlain v.
Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
138. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1976) defines "return information" as:
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, over-assessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is
being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing...
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document relating to
such written determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b)) which is not
open to public inspection. . . but such term does not include data in a form which
cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular tax-
payer.
Id
139. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
140. Id at 365 (quoting I.ILC. § 6103(b)(2)); see Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also supra note 138.
141. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 701(a), 95 Stat. 340 (1981Xcodified at IMRC. § 6103(b)).
142. Long released Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data to private in-
dividuals. TCMP involves a random selection of tax returns that are screened and weighted under
a scoring system that identifies those returns with a high tax change potential. Such returns are
the most likely to be audited. This system provides the standards used for the selection of returns
for audit or examination and is the object of the ERTA amendment, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 701(a),
95 Stat. 340 (1981), which states
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test" remains and was subsequently followed by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Neufeld v. IRS.' 43 In 1982,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in King v.
IRS 144 rejected the identity test, preferring instead its own, more ex-
pansive definition.
Both the Long and King courts interpreted the Haskell amend-
ment 45 to section 6103 to support their definition of "return informa-
tion." The Haskell amendment states that return information "does
not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or other-
wise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."' 46 From
this, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, uniess
data could identify the taxpayer, it could not be withheld as return in-
formation. 147 Application of the test in Long and Neufeld illustrates its
flexibility; the test allows the district court to determine on an ad hoc
basis whether the release of particular data would "entail a significant
risk of identification."'' 4 In other words, it balances the privacy inter-
ests inherent in the information with the public's right of access under
the FOIA.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed this inter-
pretation as a failure to consider the phrase "data in aform.' 49 It
agreed with the IRS that, if read to include this phrase, the amendment
allows the release of tax data only if it is "changed in form , by amalga-
mation with data from other taxpayers to form statistical tables or stud-
ies." 50 Compared to the identity test, this standard is inflexible,
leaving no room for judicial discretion: whether or not raw data could
identify the submitter, unless it is compiled in statistical form with sim-
Nothing in the preceding sentence [defining "return information"], or in any other
provision of law, shall be construed to require the disclosure of standards used or to be
used for the selection ofreturns for examination, or data used or to be used for determin-
ing such standards, if the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seriously impair
assessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue laws.
Id Recently, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether the ERTA did, in fact, overruleLongtr result.
It remanded the case to District Court, ordering the IRS to release non-exempt information. Long
v. IRS, No. 82-3030 (9th Cir. Dec 1, 1982).
143. 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
144. 688 F.2d at 488.
145. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1525, 1668 (codified at
I.R.C. § 6103(b) (1976)).
146. Id
147. Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d at 367.
148. Id The Neufeld court described this flexibility best: "We do not hold ... that mere
deletion of names and addresses removes all return information .... The District Court has
discretion to determine what information, other than name and address, poses a risk ofidentifying
a taxpayer and how great that risk is." 646 F.2d at 665.
149. King v. IRS, 688 F.2d at 491.
150. Id (emphasis added).
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ilar data from other taxpayers, it is return information per se and is
subject to withholding.
The King court also sharply criticized the Long-Neufeld identity
test for "importing the policies of the FOIA into the interpretation of
section 6103, a statute whose privacy-protecting purpose is precisely the
opposite of that of FOIA."'' 1 Although Long balanced section 6103's
privacy interests against the FOIA's public access interests, it also
adopted the identity test to balance taxpayer privacy against the pur-
pose of the Haskell amendment to permit disclosure when no serious
risk to that privacy exists. 152 The King court dismissed the latter posi-
tion by concluding that the only purpose of the Haskell amendment is
to provide "for the disclosure of statistical tabulations which are not
associated with or do not identify particular taxpayers."' 53 Thus, the
King court held that there are no countervailing freedom of informa-
tion interests within section 6103 to balance, and that such a balancing
of interests "completely overlooks the deleterious impact upon our vol-
untary system of tax payment which is likely to result if taxpayers know
their private financial information is subject to exposure upon the mere
striking of their names and addresses."' 54 Each court's definition of
"return information" is entirely consistent with the purposes it imputes
to section 6103 and the Haskell amendment.
Predicting the view more likely to prevail is easier here than in the
Greentree-Painter circuit split155 because the King decision closely re-
151. Id at 493. One other argument is worth mentioning. Both the Long and King courts
examined the Haskell Amendment's "scant" legislative history, id at 492; each court drew oppo-
site conclusions. The history consisted of Senator Haskell's comments regarding the purpose of
his amendment, the gist of which was that the IRS should not "evade its previously existing obli-
gation to disclose statistical studies simply by adding identifying information." Id at 493. In
Long, the IRS argued that, because the amendment's purpose was to freeze the status quo at the
time of its enactment and because the requirement to disclose edited raw data would be a signifi-
cant extension of its duty to disclose under the law prior to the amendment, it should not be
required to release such edited data. The Long court summarily dismissed this argument as un-
supported by Senator Haskell's statement. See 596 F.2d at 368. The court also implied that the
statement was consistent with its identity test. The King court, on the other hand, asserted that
Senator Haskell's statement "in no way" supported the identity test, 688 F.2d at 493, and in fact
was consistent with the IRS's position. The courts' differing interpretations indicate that the legis-
lative history of the Amendment is too inconclusive to be of significant value.
152. 596 F.2d at 368; see Merritt, The Use ofthe Freedom of Information Act in Federal Tax
Matters, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX. § 38-1 (1981). The 1976 amendments to § 6103 "provide a de-
tailed balancing of an individual's or other government agency's right to obtain information from
the [Internal Revenue] Service with the need of taxpayers generally to consider that the informa-
tion which they provide to the Service or which the Service gathers in auditing a taxpayer's return
will remain confidential." Id at § 38.0412].
153. 688 F.2d at 493 (emphasis added).
154. Id at 494.
155. See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
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sembles the Supreme Court's 1982 construction of sections 8(b) and
9(a) of the Census Act inBaldtge v. Shapiro. 56 There are at least four
points of congruity. First, both decisions firmly reject the identity test
as a way of measuring privacy interests in the data that citizens volun-
tarily supply to federal agencies.157 Second, both decisions specifically
conclude that data regarding individuals may be released only in statis-
tical form.' 58 Third, both decisions emphasize that the efficacy of "vol-
untary" programs, like federal income taxation and the decennial
census, depends on the public's confidence that information supplied to
the government will not be released to others.1 59 Finally, and most im-
portantly, both decisions refuse to accept that the particular statutes at
issue may incorporate both privacy and freedom of information inter-
ests. 6o These similarities suggest that, if the Supreme Court considers
the issue, it will defer to its own reasoning and favor the King decision.
IV. Tim PERSONAL PRIVACY ExEMPTIONS
A principal reason for enacting the FOIA was to provide maxi-
mum public access to government information while protecting the in-
dividual's right to privacy.' 6' The personal privacy exemptions,
sections (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), establish this delicate balance. Exemption
(b)(6) allows withholding of "personnel and medical records and simi-
lar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy"; 162 exemption (b)(7)(C) permits with-
holding of "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
156. See .pra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
157. Compare supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text with supra notes 145-50 and accompa-
nying text.
158. Compare spra note 93 and accompanying text wih supra notes 150-53 and accompany-
ing text.
159. Compare King v. IRS, 688 F.2d at 494 with Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. at 354. Al-
though the Supreme Court in Badrge v. Shapiro recognized that the Secretary of Commerce has
enforcement powers to ensure compliance with the census, it based its argument for census data
confidentiality on the proposition that, for all practical purposes, census response is voluntary. Id
("Although Congress has broad power to require individuals to submit responses, an accurate
census depends in large part on public cooperation."). The King court, however, paid no attention
to enforcement provisions available to the IRS. See I.ILC. § 7203 (1976). This detracts somewhat
from the Kfg court's argument that data release will undermine taxpayer participation in the
payment of federal income taxes. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
160. Compare .mpra notes 99-105 and accompanying text with supra notes 151-54 and accom-
panying text.
161. -The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that
will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from
unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to government informa-
tion." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), reprinedin THE 1981 EDmON OF LmrIoA-
TION UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr AND PRIVACY AcT 77 (C. Marwick ed. 1980).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX6) (1976).
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poses... to the extent that the production of such records would...
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 1 63
In 1982, the Supreme Court addressed these exemptions in FBI v.
Abramson16 4 and State Department v. Washington Post, Inc. 1 65 Both
decisions dealt with the lower courts' increasing emphasis on form
(statutory language) over substance (statutory purpose), an emphasis
that often led to absurd or anomalous results. By focusing on whether
information was a "similar" file under (b)(6) or an "investigatory rec-
ord" under (b)(7)(C), the lower courts had lost sight of the delicate bal-
ance between public access and privacy.1 66 Abramson and Washington
Post represent the Supreme Court's attempt to direct judicial attention
toward the effects of withholding or releasing particular information.
Thus, in the future, the central question in any FOIA personal privacy
analysis will be whether release of the information constitutes an "un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy," not whether the information
falls within certain predetermined and artificial categories.1 67
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976). Exemption (b)(7), in full, states
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are--
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential
source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confi-
dential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the
life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Id
164. 658 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2054 (1982).
165. 647 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1981), revyd, 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
166. InAbramson, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that
a record compiled for political purposes but which contained information extracted from exempt
law enforcement documents was not exempt. 658 F.2d at 812-14. Its justification was that "inves-
tigatory records" meant documents and since the docwnent was not exempt, it did not matter
whether the information it contained was exempt. Similarly, in Washington Post, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered whether the document at issue was simi-
lar to other files withheld in the past. The court likened the document to one previously released
and concluded that, regardless of the private nature of the information contained within the docu-
ment, it was not a "similar file" that might be withheld. 647 F.2d at 199. The information was not
"intimate" enough to warrant withholding. Judge Lumbard, in his concurrence, stated that, if this
case were one of first impression, he would vote to withhold. However, because such a ruling
would overrule Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(m which the similar document
was released), he had to vote to release the information. 647 F.2d at 200. These narrow ap-
proaches focused on narrow issues and failed to review Congress' purposes for the (bX6) and
(b)(7)(C) exemptions.
167. See infra notes 174-78, 192-95 and accompanying text. The Court, in reestablishing its
priorities, in effect watered down these threshold requirements. InAbramson, this is clearly illus-
trated by a statement by Justice White: "It is... critical that the compiled-for-law-enforcement
requirement be construed to avoid the release of information that would produce the undesirable
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A. Exemption (b)(7)(C) and FBI v. Abramson.
FBI v. Abramson dealt specifically with exemption (b)(7)(C) and
its application to a document that the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held did not meet the "investigatory records"
threshold. The case arose when the plaintiff journalist filed a FOIA
request with the FBI, seeking a one-page memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman and "name check summaries" contain-
ing information about eleven public figures. 168 The court held that,
although the summaries might contain information exempt under
(b)(7)(C), the document containing the information was drafted for
political, not law enforcement purposes.1 69 Thus, its narrow decision
turned on the threshold criterion that the document was not an "inves-
tigatory record compiled for law enforcement purposes."170
results specified." 102 S. CL at 2063. In Washington Post, this is illustrated by the text accompa-
nying infia notes 193-95.
168. The documents requested contained information regarding eleven public figures. The
information was summarized from FBI law enforcement documents. Mr. Abramson requested
the information to test his hypothesis that the White House used FBI resources to obtain deroga-
tory information about "political opponents and those that it perceived as enemies." Abramson v.
FBI, 658 F.2d at 808.
169. I.d at 814.
170. Id Because the document failed the first tep of the two-part test, the court did not
consider the second-step inquiry into whether its release would constitute an "unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy." Id The holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit suggests the crucial question: What is a "record"?
Since the 1974 FOIA amendments, there has been considerable confusion as to the meaning
of the word "records," particularly as it appears in the threshold "investigatory records" inquiry.
Prior to 1974, exemption (b)(7) applied to "investigatory fles." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(1966Xamended 1974). In 1974, Congress revised this language to read "investigatory records." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS AND SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94ni CONG., IST SEss., SoURcE BooK ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND
AMENDMENTS OF 1974, at 515 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCE
BOOK]. This particular amendment was prompted, in part, by congressional concern that agencies
were "commingling non-exempt information with exempt files." Id at 45 1. Because the courts
applied the section (b)(7) criteria to entire files, this commingling effectively shielded the non-
exempt information from disclosure. By amending section (b)(7) to apply to "records" instead of
"files," Congress hoped to compel the courts to evaluate individually each record within a file to
determine its status. Id at 515 (Attorney General's Memorandum). By providing additionally
that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record" which is not exempt must be released, Con-
gress hoped to eliminate the umbrella (b)(7) exemption. Id at 524.
In this confusion, the courts have variously applied the (b)(7) criteria to files, see Moorefield
v. United States Secret Serv., 611 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 909, 909-12
(1980)(White, J, dissenting), documents, see Abramson v. FBI, portions of documents, see Lesar
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 489-92 (D.C. Cir. !980), and other information
groupings. The distinctions are important because they ultimately determine the volume of infor-
mation released. For example, if the (b)(7) threshold criterion is applied to "documents," the
status of the entire document often determines its releasability. If applied to a smaller grouping,
only the specific exempt portions of the document may be withheld. In Abramron, because the
entire document was non-exempt, it was released.
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The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice White. The
Court began by establishing (b)(7)(C)'s "two-part inquiry": "First, a
requested document must be shown to have been an investigatory rec-
ord 'compiled for law enforcement purposes.' [Second], the agency
must demonstrate that release of the material would have one of the six
results specified in the Act [in subsections (b)(7)(A)-(F)]." 17'
The Court then examined the lower court's application of this test.
Although the Supreme Court used the term "documents" in its own
articulation of the two-part inquiry and labeled the court of appeals'
application of this inquiry to documents a "tenable" construction of
section (b)(7), 172 the Court expressed concern about the anomalous re-
sults of such an application. 7 3 The two-part inquiry in Abramson al-
lowed law enforcement information normally exempt under the FOIA
to be released when recompiled in a non-exempt document even if such
release would be an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Therefore, to ensure that all law enforcement information, no matter
where compiled, is subject to both parts of the (b)(7)(C) test, the Court
defined "records" to mean "information."'174
The "reasonably segregable" provision of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) has alleviated the problem
of exempting non-exempt information within an exempt document. As Lesar demonstrates, how-
ever, such information is sometimes withheld because analysis under section (b)(7)(C) focuses on
the document, and the document is exempt. See also infra note 180 and accompanying text.
171. 102 S. Ct. at 2059; sei also infra note 178 and accompanying text.
172. 102 S. Ct. at 2060.
173. The Court of Appeals would protect information compiled in a law enforcement
record when transferred in original form to another agency for non-exempt purposes but
would withdraw that protection of the same information or record if transmitted in
slightly different form. In terms of statutory objectives, this distinction makes little sense.
Id at 2062. The majority believed that its construction of the (b)(7)(C) test would alleviate this
anomalous result and would be more in keeping with Congress' purpose.
In contrast, Justice O'Connor concluded in a vigorous dissent that the "plain meaning" of
exemption (b)(7) could lead to no other alternative than that arrived at by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. Even if there were doubts about the true meaning of the statutory language, "those
doubts would have to be resolved in favor of disclosure." Id at 2067.
174. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, makes perhaps the clearest statement of this definition.
He concluded that "the Court has simply substituted the word 'information' for the word 'records'
in Exemption 7(C)." Id at 2065. This holding must be clarified because of Justice White's incon-
sistent use of many synonyms for "records" throughout his opinion. His intent to focus on infor-
marion is consistent only in his restatement of the two-part inquiry. See infra text accompanying
note 178.
Athough this new focus on information subjects all of the information in Abramson to both
parts of the (b)(7)(C) test, there are situations in which it might prevent such a two-stage analysis.
For example, in Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980). the infor-
mation contained within a law enforcement document was invalidly obtained law enforcement
information not subject to (bX7)(C)'s protection and was withheld. UnderAbramson's new focus,
the information would be released after it fails to pass the threshold "investigatory records" in-
quiry. In this way, the increased information withholding in cases like Abramson may be offset by
the increased information released in cases like Lesar. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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To support this new interpretation, the Court looked to the legisla-
tive history of the FOIA and its 1974 amendments. Although the
FOIA does not expressly define "records," 1 5 the Court concluded that
Congress intended that (b)(7) analysis focus on "information." First,
the Court examined Congress' list of six specific (b)(7) subsections
describing information which, if disclosed, would cause more harm
than benefit.17 6 Second, the Court found that the 1974 substitution of
"records" for "files" implied that "Congress intended for courts to 'con-
sider the nature of the particular document. . . in order to avoid the
possibility of impermissible 'commingling ... . "M The Court,
therefore, revised the two-part inquiry: "Once it is established that in-
formation was compiled pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
vestigation and that disclosure of such information would lead to one
of the listed harms, the information is exempt."' 78
Because Abramson exempts information contained in a non-ex-
empt document, the Court appears to have construed (b)(7)(C) broadly
to restrict public access under the FOIA. This is true, however, only if
Abramson is read to apply solely to exempt information in non-exempt
documents. This decision purports to eliminate altogether the concept
of exempt and non-exempt documents under (b)(7)(C). 17 9 Therefore,
the increased release of some information and increased withholding of
other information may have little effect on the total volume of releas-
able information. Although "reasonably segregable" non-exempt in-
formation has always been releasable under FOIA section (b),
Abramson complements this provision:180 all non-exempt information
in documents once considered exempt is releasable under both the
175. 102 S. Ct. at 2061.
176. Id at 2062.
177. Id (emphasis supplied); see supra note 170.
178. Id at 2064.
179. The Court rejects the concept of exempt and non-exempt documents by (1) prohibiting
the commingling of non-exempt information in exempt documents, id at 2062, and (2) prohibiting
the release of exempt information contained within non-exempt documents. This new focus on
information now appears to require courts to examine "information in the abstract," contrary to
its holding in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 (1980), quoledin FBI v. Abramson, 102 S. Ct.
at 2065 (Blackmun, J, dissenting).
180. By providing that "information" must satisfy the (b)(7XC) analysis, exempt information
will be withheld and non-exempt information will be released. Assuming that the "reasonably
segregable" provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976), has always been followed--at least with respect to
(b7)C)--then non-exempt information has always been released and this new focus on informa-
tion will only result in increased information withholding. If the "reasonably segregable" rule has
not always been strictly followed, however, then this decision will also result in increased informa-
tion release. For an example of one instance in which information obtained during an invalid law
enforcement investigation-and not exempt under (b)(7XC)--was exempted by the court because
it was contained in a law enforcement document, see Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636
F.2d 472 (D.C Cir. 1980).
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"reasonably segregable" provision and the Abramson test. Similarly,
exempt information in documents once considered non-exempt is now
subject to withholding. Abramson also greatly increases the agency's
burden of proving exemption; it now must show that each piece of in-
formation in a document is exempt.' 8' Finally,Abramson increases the
burden on the courts because they must "parse agency records and de-
termine whether any piece of information contained in these records
was originally compiled for a law enforcement purpose."' 8 2
B. Exemption (b)(6) and State Department v. Washington Post, Inc.
To facilitate application of exemption (b)(6) to particular govern-
ment records, the courts have adopted a two-part test similar to the one
used for section (b)(7)(C) exemptions.18 3 The court first determines
whether the record is a personnel, medical, or "similar" file and, sec-
ond, whether the disclosure of the record would "constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'' 4 Through mechanical
application of this test in recent years, courts have developed categories
of "similar" fiesf 8-s In cases of first impression, courts usually compare
the document in question with others previously categorized. If the
privacy interest is "similar" to a document previously withheld under
(b)(6), the threshold is satisfied, and the court will go to the second step.
If, however, the privacy interest is "similar" to a non-(b)(6) document
the inquiry ends and the document is released.' 86
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied
this two-part test in State Department v. Washington Post, Inc. ,187 to
determine that (b)(6) did not exempt State Department records indicat-
ing the citizenship status of two Iranian nationals. The court compared
the privacy interest in these documents to the privacy interest in similar
records that included naturalization dates. Because the court had de-
181. See 102 S. Ct. at 2064.
182. Id at 2065 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
184. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). This two-part test is adapted from the language of the stat-
ute, which states: "(b) This section does not apply io matters that a ... (6) personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy...."
185. See, eg., United States Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (summaries of
Air Force Academy disciplinary actions are "similar files"); Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 618
F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980) (union authorization cards are "similar files").
186. For a criticism of past uses of this test, see Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of
Informat'on Act-1981, supra note 2.
187. 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
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nied (b)(6) exemption to these similar records in an earlier case,1"8 it
held that the requested documents failed the "similar files" threshold
and thus could be released.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Its primary concern was that the
court of appeals' decision led to results not contemplated by Congress.
In an opinion joined by seven other Justices, Justice Rehnquist ex-
amined the legislative history of the exemption and asserted that "Con-
gress' primary purpose in enacting [(b)(6)] was to protect individuals
from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unneces-
sary disclosure of personal information." 1 9 A narrow interpretation of
"similar files" detracts from this purpose by releasing some records
without a second-step inquiry into possible injury or embarrassment. 90
The Court thus concluded that "similar files" must be read broadly.
The Court also found that Congress intended (b)(6) to be a "gen-
eral exemption" statute that excludes from mandatory disclosure those
kinds of files "the disclosure of which might harm the individual."'' 91
On the other hand, Congress also enacted the FOIA to increase public
access to government information. 92 The court of appeals' narrow
construction of "similar files" appeared to resolve these conflicting
goals by releasing all records that lack privacy interests similar to medi-
cal and personnel files.193 Justice Rehnquist argued, however, that the
second step, not the first, limits exemption (b)(6):
"[Tihe scope of the exemption is held within bounds by use of the
limitation of 'a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.' ....
... Had the words "similar files" been intended to be only a
narrow addition to "Personnel and medical files," there would seem
to be no reason for [Congress'] concern about the exemption's being
"held within bounds," and there surely would be clear suggestion in
the legislative history that such a narrow meaning was intended. We
have found none.194
Therefore, the Court broadly defined "similar files" as "detailed gov-
ernment records on an individual which can be identified as applying
to that individual"' 195 If requested information satisfies this expanded
188. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit compared the files at issue to
ones previously released in Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See supra note 166.
189. 456 U.S. at 599.
190. Id at 600-01.
191. Id at 601 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966)).
192. See generally supra text accompanying notes 108-117, 128.
193. See 456 U.S. at 600-01.
194. Id at 600 (citations omitted).
195. Id at 602 (quoting H.L REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966)).
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threshold, the second prong determines whether its release will cause
injury or embarrassment and thus will not be permitted.
The Court also noted the anomalous results of the court of ap-
peals' approach. Under the plain language of section (b)(6), any infor-
mation contained within a personnel or medical file can be withheld "if
its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."' 96 Because the court of appeals' test would subject to
mandatory disclosure identical information contained within a non-
"similar file,"' 97 the Court found that the test improperly emphasized
form over substance. 93
Washington Post permits the critical balancing of public access
and personal privacy by relaxing the "similar files" threshold to include
any file containing information personal to an individual. As in Ab-
ramson, Washington Post's immediate effect will be to restrict informa-
tion disclosure. 199 Both decisions also focus on whether the release of
information would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."2w Furthermore, by emphasizing the common second steps of
the exemption (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) analyses, both decisions give mean-
ing to the "reasonably segregable" requirement.2° ' The implication is
that increased withholding of exempt information contained in what
were once non-"similar files" may be offset by the rejuvenated require-
ment that non-exempt information contained in "similar files" must be
released.202 Thus, the net effect on the volume of released information
may be slight.
196. Id at 602.
197. Id at 601.
198. Id
199. TheAbramson decision withheld law enforcement information that the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit was willing to release, see supra note 174 and accompanying
text, while Washington Post withheld information in what the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had ruled a non-"similar file." See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
200. Compare supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text with .pra notes 193-94 and accom-
panying text.
201. The Court in bothAbramson and Washington Post focuses on whether the release of the
information within the document will result in invasions of personal privacy. In so doing, the Court
shifts the focus away from the nature of the document as either an "investigatory record" or a
"similar file" and toward the nature of the information contained therein. Compare supra note
178 and accompanying text with supra note 194-95 and accompanying text.
202. In exemption (b)(6) cases, the federal courts appear to have diligently applied the "rea-
sonably segregable" provision so that non-exempt information will be released. Therefore, the
conclusion that increased withholding of information will be offset by increased release is not as
certain as it is inAbramson. But even if such increased withholding is not offset it does not appear
that the increased withholding will have a significant effect on the current volume of information
released.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1982, the Reagan adminitration made full use of its discretion
under the FOIA to unilaterally change the Act's impact without chang-
ing its language. The Justice Department's "submitters' rights" memo-
randum implemented several Hatch amendment proposals at the
agency level, and President Reagan used his latitude under exemption
(b)(1) to replace the pro-disclosure Carter Executive order with his own
pro-withholding order. These nonjudicial FOIA developments make
clear the Reagan administration's philosophy that many aspects of the
FOIA provide greater burdens than benefits to the federal government
and the nation.
The 1982 federal court developments generally paralleled this
trend toward increased information withholding. In Abramson and
Washington Post, the Supreme Court overhauled the (b)(6) "similar
files" and (b)(7)(C) "investigatory records" criteria in an effort to focus
future analyses on the heart of these exemptions-personal privacy. Of
the three significant cases addressing the (b)(3) federal statutes exemp-
tion, only the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Greentree v. United States Customs Service increased
information disclosure. In King v. IRS, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit broadened the scope of Internal Revenue Code section
6103 to withhold all raw tax data, thereby diverging from prior deci-
sions in other circuits that limited withholding to data that could iden-
tify a particular taxpayer. Finally, in Baldrige v. Shapiro, the Supreme
Court established that Census Act sections 8(b) and 9(a) are exemption
(b)(3) statutes. The Court went on to interpret the scope of those provi-
sions broadly, thereby departing significantly from its prior decisions
that stressed accuracy as the census' constitutionally-mandated goal.
Although the 1982 developments largely restricted federal infor-
mation disclosure, they fall far short of the restrictions contemplated by
the Hatch amendments. Until now, public access supporters have lob-
bied successfully against some of the Hatch bill's most controversial
proposals. If the pro-withholding trend in the Reagan administration
and the courts continues, however, the Hatch amendments may be yet
another step in the same direction.
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